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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship today stands at a crossroad, its form and substance
subject to transformation by two movements that are about to converge.
These movements, or forces, are (i) outsider jurisprudence-the writing of
Critical Legal Studies scholars, feminists, and minorities of color; and (ii) the
electronic transformation of media. Our first task will be to describe the two
forces-the new legal scholarship and the electronic revolution-in some
detail. Following this, we shall offer some predictions on what may happen
should they merge. Will one force cancel the other out, as some have
suggested? Or, will computerization of legal research facilitate the work of
law reform, uniting the two forces in a single powerful impetus for social
and legal change? What, if anything, can lawyers and legal scholars do to
assure that the second eventuality, not the first, takes place?
II. OUTSIDER JURISPRUDENCE: THE FIRST MOVEMENT
Outsiderjurisprudence takes three principal forms: Critical Legal Studies
(CLS),' feminism,2 and the "New" or Critical Race Theory (CRT).3
Critical thought, in general, traces its origins to such European writers as
Marx, Heidegger, Gramsci, and Foucault, as well as to the work of the
Technical Services Law Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law;
M.L.S. Simmons College 1963; M.A. University of San Francisco, 1989.
"" Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
J.D., University of California - Berkeley, 1974.
' See THE POLrrIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys, 2d ed. 1990)
[hereinafter POLrrIcs OF LAW].
2For an introduction to feminist thought, see FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (C.
Sunstein ed. 1990); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
3 See Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critique of Legal
Academia, 103 HARV. L. REv. 184 (1990).
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Frankfurt school that flourished during the 1920s.4 Critical thought first
gained a foothold in philosophy, literature, sociology, and anthropology.5
Here, criticalists challenged received ideas such as universality, objectivity,
neutrality, and the notion that every text had a single or determinate
6meaning.
Law lagged behind other text-based disciplines in incorporating these
new approaches. For example, hermeneutics, the science of textual
interpretation, had entered the study of scriptural texts in the 1800s through
the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher.7 In the 1970s, structuralism and
deconstruction added a radical new dimension to the interpretation of literary
texts.' Not until the 1980s, however, did critical legal scholars introduce
deconstruction into law.9
They also borrowed the idea of indeterminacy and applied it to law,
urging that legal reasoning rarely, if ever, has just "one right answer."1"
Instead, there will be multiple interpretations of the available precedent from
which judges may choose on the way to resolving the case before them.
Other criticalists look behind legal reasoning to the panoply of
presuppositions, agendas, and hidden assumptions that make up legal
culture-the baseline from which legal argument proceeds." Duncan
4 For discussion of the historical roots of CLS, see M. KELMAN, GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (1989); Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. (1984)
(collection of articles on CLS history, tenets, and subdivisions within movement); Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1984).
5 M. KELMAN, supra note 4; Symposium, supra note 4; Unger, supra note 4. On the
origins of contemporary critical thought in these other disciplines, see R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A
HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL & THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH,
1923-1950 (1973).
6 E.g., Unger, supra note 4; Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); H.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
7 F. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTICS: THE HANDWRITTEN MANUSCRIPTS (H.
Kimmerle ed. 1978).
8 S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); A. BERMAN, FROM THE NEW
CRITICISM TO DECONSTRUCTION: THE RECEPTION OF STRUCTURALISM AND POST-
STRUCTURALISM (1988).
D . KAIRYS, supra note 1; Symposium, supra note 4.
10 E.g., Kelman, supra note 6 (indeterminacy, sometimes called "trashing" by CLS
adherents); Kennedy & Gabel, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). For
early exposition of law's indeterminacy from a leading Legal Realist, see K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1926).
" Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MIcH.
L. REv. 2411, 2412-14 (1989).
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Kennedy, for example, deconstructed Blackstone's Commentaries, showing
how their underlying structure reflected and advanced the values of Western
liberal-capitalist thought.12 Other scholars have applied deconstructionist
techniques to such areas of law as contracts, property, and civil rights. 3
Critical Legal Studies spawned and influenced two additional
movements, feminist legal thought14 and CRT. 5 A number of women and
scholars of color found CLS attractive because it challenged the dominant
liberal beliefs about law's objectivity and the sacred inviolability of texts.
Feminist legal scholars (some of whom identify themselves as fem-Crits)
write about the ubiquitous patriarchy of the law and other social
institutions.16 Scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West have
focused on pornography,17 divorce laws, 8 and sexual harassment in the
workplace. Other writers have decried law's embrace of universality, urging
instead an emphasis on context, particularity, and "voice."
Feminist legal scholars also examine legal education, addressing such
issues as bias in the curriculum, silencing in the classroom, and lack of
opportunities for women following graduation.2 They have challenged male
12 Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205
(1979).
11 Dalton, An Essay on the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 999
(1985); Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 711 (1980); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-
discrimination Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
,1 See FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 2; C. MACKINNON, supra note
2; Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
,1 See Delgado, supra note 3; Colloquy, supra note 3.
16 For discussion of the idea of patriarchy-that law, like most social institutions,
reflects male norms and values-see West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1988); C. MACKINNON, supra note 2.
17 MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
920 (1985).
"8 Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
19 C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
10 Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597 (1991). See Symposium,
Excluded Voices: Realities in Law and Law Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1987).
21 E.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Olsen, The Sex of the Law
(1986) (unpublished manuscript); Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's
Subordination, in THE PoLrrIcs OF LAW, supra note 1, at 117.
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bias in law school appointments, promotion, and tenure standards?' They
have been concerned that unorthodox scholarship be accepted as valid and
worthy.' Some write critiques of standard casebooks that exclude women
or women's point of view.' Others write women's legal history and
biography.
Within feminism itself, two debates currently are being waged. In one,
feminist scholars debate the extent to which feminism can be incorporated
within traditional jurisprudence, or whether, by contrast, it has a unique
methodology.' A related issue is the necessity or advisability of defining
a unitary ("essential") position for the movement.' Feminists of color, for
example, have been urging that the privileging of white women's
perspectives leads to marginalization of their own experience and inattention
to their unique needs.27 Further, they stress that the difference in
perspective and agenda that feminists in general find between themselves and
the dominant male framework must be carried further to include differences
within the female community itself.' Writers such as Kim Crenshaw, Mari
Matsuda, and Leslie Espinoza have been raising such issues in connection
with race-remedies law, hate-speech, employment discrimination, and other
areas.
29
1 E.g., Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of
Exclusion, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1625 (1990).
1 E.g., Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2128 (1989); Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic
Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1864
(1990).
24 Dalton, supra note 13; Frug, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1065 (1985).
1 Bartlett, Feminist Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990); Kay, Models of
Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39 (1985).
16 E.g., Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist
Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 24 (1990); Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
27 Harris, supra note 26; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A BlackFeminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
28 Fineman, supra note 26; Harris, supra note 26; Crenshaw, supra note 27; Scales-
Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L.
& FEM. 305 (1990).
29 Crenshaw, supra note 27; Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 1331 (1988); Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds
in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1988); Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989);
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Critical Race Theory took root in the late 1970s when Derrick Bell first
questioned the adequacy of conventional race-remedies law to achieve its
self-professed aims.' Minority scholars in this movement expressed dismay
that the gains of the Civil Rights era were unstable, and indeed were being
rolled back in the late 1970s and 1980s. " New approaches were needed to
take account of the complex interaction among race, racism, and American
law. 2 A central theme of much of this scholarship is "interest
convergence"-an idea developed by Derrick Bell-which holds that the
majority group advances the cause of racial justice only when it suits its
interest to do so.33
Other writers question whether race-remedies law is even designed to
benefit Blacks. 4 Some put forward the equally surprising suggestion that
civil rights law itself furthers and deepens the dilemma of persons of
color."5 Some explain that race-remedies law serves a homeostatic function,
assuring that racial progress occurs at just the right slow pace! 6 Too-rapid
change would be terrifying for the white majority; too-slow change could
prove destabilizing.37 Other writers use critical tools to address classic civil
rights issues, such as federal Indian law,3" reparations for Blacks and
Asians,- remedies for racist speech and hate crimes,' immigration policy
Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1878 (1990).
11 For a history of the Critical Race Theory movement, see Delgado, supra note 3;
Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story." Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95
(1990).
31 Delgado, supra note 3, at 6.
32 Id.
33 Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
31 The most prominent spokesperson for this view is DerrickBell. See, e.g., D. BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1988).
3 5 D. BELL, supra note 34; Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform:
Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988).
31 Delgado, supra note 35, at 923-24.
37 Id.
38 Williams, Documents of Barbarism, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 237 (1989).
39 Matsuda, Looking To the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
0 Matsuda, supra note 29; Lawrence, IfiHe Hollers, Let Him Go, 1990 DuKE L.J.
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and bilingual education,4' sentencing and capital punishment,42 and the
elimination of bias in civil litigation and alternative dispute resolution.43
Many of these writers employ innovative forms of writing, such as
parables, narratives, poems, and chronicles to depict racial injustice in ways
not possible in conventional legal style.'
A group of CRT scholars met formally for the first time in Madison,
Wisconsin, in the summer of 1989 to discuss the future of the movement and
their common themes. Later meetings focused on neomarxism, critical
methodology, the purported neutrality of law, the role of "merit," and post-
Western political theory. Their voices seem to have had an impact. The
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) chose as its theme for the
1990 Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California, "A Time for Sharing:
Speaking Difference, Sharing Strength."45 Plenary speakers and workshop
panelists of color addressed such critical issues as narrative theory and race,
the current retrenchment of American race remedies law, and majority
mindset in legal institutions.
Recently, the movement has come under fire from mainstream
writers.47 In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Randall Kennedy
attacked the scholarship of some of the group's central members." He
accused the group of making unsubstantiated claims and charges, of engaging
in self-serving "racial politics," and of militarizing discourse in the area of
racial justice.4" Members of the group, and a few white sympathizers,
"I Olivas, 7he Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990); Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 321 (1987).
42 Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't
Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 579.
" Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359; Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
11 D. BELL, supra note 34; Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987); Delgado, supra note
11.
45 Ass'n of American Law Schools, A Time for Sharing: Speaking Difference, Sharing
Strength (1989) (program of annual meeting).
46 Id.
I Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, 249 THE NATION 246 (Sept. 4/11, 1989)
(describing controversy over CRT in legal academia); Rothfeld, Minority Critic Stirs
Debate on Minority Writing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at B-6, col. 3 (final ed.).
41 Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989).
49 Id. at 1760-87, 1789-97, 1807-15.
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responded that Kennedy had failed to understand and appreciate the unique
message of the insurgent scholars, that he had misread their scholarship and
applied inconsistent standards to their work.' For now, the coalition seems
to be weathering these and other criticisms. More critiques of the racial
status quo appear almost monthly and show no sign of abating.51
As the foregoing indicates, legal scholarship has reached an exciting
crossroad. Women, minorities, and Criticalists of the majority group have
developed powerful critiques using innovative modes of expression. They
have challenged law's stability and predictability, relentlessly showing its
self-serving, hierarchy-maintaining quality and exposing its indeterminacy.
New voices are being heard and, indeed, being accepted. Whether the current
ferment will endure, and in what form, will be analyzed following discussion
of the second transformation, or movement, namely the electronic revolution
in media.
Ill. COMPUTERIZATION OF LEGAL RESEARCH:
THE SECOND REVOLUTION
While outsider jurisprudence has been developing and winning
acceptance, another transformation has been taking place in legal information
science.52 The invention of electronic data processing led to the
development of the two main legal databases-LEXIS and WESTLAW.55
These and other proprietary research services afford attorneys and legal
scholars virtually instant access to multiple libraries of data including cases,
statutes, administrative materials, and law review articles. The last decade
brought CD ROM technology, which allows thousands of pages of printed
text to be stored on, and retrieved from a disc no larger than a dinner
I See generally Colloquy, supra note 3 (containing reply articles by Milner Ball,
Leslie Espinoza, Robin Barnes and Richard Delgado); Delgado, supra note 3; Delgado,
supra note 30.
S Robert Williams, Professor of Law, University of Arizona School of Law, is
currently preparing a bibliography of Critical Race Theory articles and books.
' See generally M. KATsH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW (1989); Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? 42 STAN. L. REv.
207 (1989).
5' Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 52, at 216 n.59.
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plate. 4 It allows access to pleadings, contracts, and other documents in
special subject libraries. 5
These new technologies in conjunction with word processing programs
allow researchers to combine materials in novel ways. 6 They make research
easier and faster, prompting some enthusiasts to predict that the pace of law
reform will accelerate. 7 Others, however, warn that the new technology
can just as easily solidify the status quo; these issues are treated in greater
detail in Part IV.
What remains clear is that changes which allow wider access to more
information have affected legal knowledge itself. Free text searching allows
the searcher a wider range of choice in subject searching, freeing him or her
from former reliance on fixed subject headings. 8 In the future, thesaurally
based subject headings may unlock powerful new avenues for legal
research. 9 Law libraries need not be limited to traditional printed legal
materials, but may serve as gateways to larger and more general networks
of information, such as DIALOG and BRS.' Researchers will have quick,
though expensive, access to journal literature of other academic disciplines,
statistical data, news reports, and even monographs.
The first book to be published electronically may well be a legal treatise;
the market is right and the technology is nearly in place.6' A century from
now, books as we know them may be on their way to extinction. Scholars
and attorneys may be forced increasingly to rely on online services of various
types to be effective and current.
4 Kauffman, Electronic Databases in Legal Research: Beyond LEXIS and WESTLAW,
13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.I. 73 (1987).
I- See Introducing the West CD-ROM Federal Civil Practice (1989) (West, Inc.
advertising brochure) (on file with authors).
56 Cohen, Research in a Changing World ofLaw and Technology, 13 DALHOUSlE L.J.
6, 13 (1990).
-7 M. KATSH, supra note 52, at 259-65; Cohen, supra note 56, at 18-19; Berring,
Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
15 (1987).
58 Berring, supra note 57.
59 See Dykstra, LC Subject Headings Disguised as a Thesaurus, 113 LIBR. J. 42 (Mar.
1, 1988); Dykstra, Can Subject Headings Be Saved?, 113 LiBR. J. 55 (Sept. 15, 1988).
o For a description of these databases, see DIALOG on Disc: Information for
Everyone (1987)(Dialog advertising brochure).
61 Cohen, supra note 56, at 13.
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IV. SYNERGY? WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN THE
Two MOVEMENTS CONVERGE?
Will computer-based research assist oppositionist lawyers and scholars
in their efforts to reform the law? Word-based computerized search strategies
do enable the searcher to devise searches that are flexible; they avoid the
constraints of preconstructed keynotes and subject headings. 2 For example,
let us suppose that the West digest system lacks a key number for
discrimination cases affecting black women: it has categories for "sex
discrimination" and "race discrimination," but not both.' A searcher
employing conventional means would find the relevant cases only with great
difficulty. A searcher employing computer search techniques could find the
cases easily, by simply constructing a search containing words such as "black
female employee" or "African-American female worker. "I Still, computer-
based research does not solve all problems. Articles and cases dealing with
ideas like civil disobedience or legitimation may not refer to these by name;
others that do so may not be included in standard databases.' Further, for
a search to be successful, the court and the searcher must use the same word
or phrase for the idea in question.' Computers may be quite useful tools
for finding cases about children who injure themselves on trampolines. They
are less helpful for finding cases dealing with abstract or complex socio-
political ideas, like those of interest to oppositionist law reformers.67
Moreover, errors may occur in entering items into databases.68 For
example, a leading critical scholar recently was surprised to learn that two
of his articles were included in Legaltrac under a misspelling of his name.'
A searcher trying to find these articles would have been unlikely to do so.
In addition, several journals and other sources of critical writing are not
included in standard periodical index databases, so that even the most diligent
Berring, supra note 57.
6 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 52, at 219-20.
6 id.
65 Id. at 221.
66 Id. at 220-21.
67 Id. at 220.
68 Id. at 213 n.42.
69 Telephone conversation between Jean Stefancic (who noticed the error) and Richard
Delgado, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law (Jan. 28, 1991).
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search might miss a leading article.7' Finally effective research must allow
for intuition and synchronicity; it should encourage browsing and analogical
reasoning.7 Computer-assisted research can sometimes be too literal,
thereby discouraging innovation and law reform.72
Computer-assisted research is also costly. Since many law reformers and
oppositional scholars are located at small schools or practice with small law
firms, they may not have access to unlimited computerized resources. Thus,
although computer-assisted research potentially affords a means by which to
break legal lockstep and reassemble data in novel ways, it can impair as well
as promote outsider jurisprudence and the cause of law reform.
There is one level at which computerization is likely to increase the
influence of an outsider group. Because of mounting caseloads, courts and
court administrators have been turning increasingly to computer-assisted
treatment of cases and dockets. 3 One approach to streamlining judicial
work is a "cut and paste" approach to opinion writing-a kind of
recombinant CPA (cut and paste adjudication).74 Although such routinized,
bureaucratized law could bode ill for the cause of law reform-since cases
presenting novel issues may fail to be perceived or treated as such-a recent
study of women judges shows that the situation may also work in reverse.
The National Organization of Women Legal Defense and Education Fund
sponsored a project to gather data about gender bias in the courts.7 The
study generated fourteen volumes detailing discrimination in all phases of
court activity.76 As a consequence, several states decided to initiate studies
or reforms of their own.' The National Association of Women Judges, one
70 Wise, Of Lizards, Intersubjective Zap, and Trashing, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE
SERVICES Q., nos. 1-2, at 7 (1988); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 52, at 220. More
recently, one of us discovered that a much-cited article on "intersectionality" (the
dilemma of, e.g., black women) did not appear on Legaltrac, because the journal in
which the article appeared was not included in the database.
7 Childress, The Hazards of Computer-Assisted Research to the Legal Profession, 55
OKLA. B.J. 1531 (1984); Cole, Thoughts from the Land of And, 39 MERCER L. REv.
907, 924-26 (1988); Dabney, The Curse of Thamus: An Analysis of Full-text Document
Retrieval, 78 LAw LIBR. .at 19. See also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 52, at 221.
72 See Childress, supra note 71; Cole, supra note 71; Dabney, supra note 71; Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 52.
1 M. KATSH, supra note 52, at 108-12; interview with ex-student now clerking for
a state Supreme Court (December, 1990) (name withheld upon request).
7' M. KATSH, supra note 52; Interview, supra note 73.
"I Cox, Reports Track Discrimination, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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of the study's cosponsors, has been meeting in an effort to increase the
influence of women judges' opinions in areas such as family law and
employment discrimination.78 Although it is too early to predict with any
certainty, it seems possible that the cut-and-paste method of opinion writing
may allow these judges' approaches to enter the mainstream more rapidly
than they otherwise would have.
One of us has offered a more pessimistic view of the likely effect of
computerization in the field of civil rights. In a recent article in Wisconsin
Law Review, Richard Delgado shows that as plaintiffs' attorneys in civil
rights cases offer ever more powerful statistical showings of discrimination,
courts merely redefine legal doctrine so as to cancel out any gains.79 Yet,
on reflection, this bleak scenario is not the only possible one. Fact patterns
demonstrable with computerized statistical analysis may spur helpful reform.
For example, the General Accounting Office, responding to congressional
inquiries, was able to demonstrate that women were being excluded from
biomedical research in federally sponsored programs.' This finding led to
legislation prompting equitable treatment of women in the health care
system."' The same may happen in law. Just as the authority of abstract
legal principles has been weakened by deconstructors and other criticalists,
so has the stability of printed texts been challenged by computerization.
Precedent will become more manipulable; arguments and lines of cases for
opposing viewpoints will be readily available, arguably to the advantage of
law reform. New legal theories may arise to reshape legal thought. If so, the
path of the oppositional scholar and advocate may become easier, not harder.
V. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing has shown, our tools of thought are changing. These
changes are mirrored in changes in legal scholarship. As society has become
less monolithic, less monocultural, legal boundaries have become more fluid.
In the short run, this may be accompanied by turmoil, as the legal status quo
resists both the new voices and the newly broadened horizons made available
through the electronic revolution. Yet, in the long run, diversity and
inclusiveness may be enhanced.
78Symposium, Nat'l Ass'n Women Judges, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 469 (1984).
7 Delgado, supra note 42.
'o Myers, NIH to Require Researchers to Include Women in Studies, 37 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. 4 (Sept. 19, 1990); La Follette, Daring Steps Are Needed to Increase
Women's Role in Science, 37 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., A-56 (Oct. 3, 1990).
s Myers, supra note 80; La Follette, supra note 80.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In this Article, we began by observing that two forces, outsider
(oppositional) jurisprudence and computerization, are currently in full
development in the law. Each has the potential to reshape drastically the
nature of legal thought in the years ahead. We described each movement and
detailed the ways in which each is beginning to affect the other. In the final
section, we offered some cautious predictions on the ways in which the two
movements could combine to strengthen the cause of legal and social reform.
Yet, they may have little-or even a negative-effect on one another. The
question is still open. The situation is elastic. The final contours remain to
be completed. As one of us has put it: "Reality, like our hopes for it, is not
fixed. We construct it through conversations, through our lives together. The
sad fact of race is that too few of these conversations ever take place; to that
extent our lives are diminished."'
Oppositional scholarship-and, with luck, computerization-may
increase the number and quality of those conversations. If that convergence
does take place, our prediction is that our lives will not be diminished, but
much enriched.
' Delgado, supra note 35, at 947.
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